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Wage differentials between the public and private sectors in the 
South African labour market 
Leigh Lakay' 
Abstract 
This study uses a cross sectional data set from South Africa's Labour Force Survey to 
investigate wage differentials and employment decisions between the public and 
private sectors in South Africa. To obtain robust estimates of the wage differential, 
two econometric techniques are employed. These are OLS estimation and the standard 
switching regression applied under full information maximum likelihood. After 
controlling for worker's characteristics and sector selection bias through full 
information maximum likelihood, we find a public sector advantage. The public 
sector wage premium varies between 6% and 421 % depending on race, gender, trade 
union affiliation and educational attainment. The wage advantage is largest for 
workers with no educational attainment. The wage premium for African and White 
workers in the public sector is substantially larger than for Coloured and Indian 
workers. The sector selection estimation reveals that Coloured and White workers are 
significantly less likely to work in the public sector than African workers. 
• School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, Cape Town. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Murray Leibbrandt for comments, Vimal Ranchhod and Taryn 
Dinkelman at the University of Michigan for providing the data and Reza Daniels for assistance with 
Stata coding. 
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1. Introduction 
In developing countries In particular and in South Africa specifically, a large 
proportion of formal sector employees are employed in the public sector (Woolard, 
2002; Stelcner, Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988 and Bosch, 2006). This 
observable fact has drawn attention to public-private sector wage differentials the 
world over. Questions raised include whether workers with the same productivity 
traits receive equal remuneration in either sector or whether public sector workers are 
underpaid? If so, why is the demand for public sector employment so high? 
Particularly, South Africa has struggled to fill administrative and professional 
vacancies in the public sector. 
Many studies have focussed on cross-sectional developed-country public-private 
sector wage differentials, with few studies evaluating these relationships for 
developing countries (for recent work see Dustman and van Soest, 1998; Mueller, 
1998; Disney and Gosling, 2003; Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2005)i.Despite wage 
differentials' vital importance for labour market policy, especially in search of 
increased economic growth and employment, estimates of wage differentials in South 
Africa are rather limited. Bhorat (2000) employed a percentile differential approach to 
disaggregate wage differentials for male workers in South Africa. While his study 
does not specifically focus on public-private sector wage differentials, his results 
illustrated that the racial wage gap is more severe than the gender wage gap. 
Notably there is a lack of panel estimates for public-private sector wage differentials 
in both developed and developing country contexts. This is a weakness in the 
I See Bender (1998) for a thorough review. 
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literature. While cross-sectional analyses can be useful in pin-pointing exactly what 
transpired at a particular point in time, panel data provide insights into transitions over 
time that are occurring in an economy. Disney and Gosling (2003) and Henley and 
Thomas (2000) undertake panel studies of public-private sector wage differentials in 
Britain. Both studies reveal a wage advantage for public sector employees. To my 
knowledge, panel studies for developing countries are more difficult to locate. 
Approximately 20% of formal non-agricultural workers in South Africa are employed 
in the public sector (Bosch, 2006f Many international studies have shown that there 
are significant differences in individual characteristics of workers between the public 
and private sectors, leading to significant differences in both conditional and 
unconditional wages between the two sectors (Casero and Seshan, 2006). As I will 
show, a similar picture emerges for South Africa and we observe significant 
differences in individual characteristics between the two sectors. Given the size of the 
public sector in South Africa, the size of the public-private sector wage differential is 
of key importance as it may affect competition for and allocation of workers between 
sectors. It is also likely to be contentious as government is "required by the 
Constitution to lead by example" (Woolard, 2002:1). Given this situation, it IS 
important to ascertain whether the public-private sector wage differential IS 
predominantly a reflection of the differences in the characteristics or whether there are 
other factors at play. Woolard (2002) investigates wage levels and inequality in the 
public sector of the South African labour market. Based on ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation, she finds that a public sector premium exists for all public sector 
workers with the exception of graduates and diplomats. This finding is consistent 
with similar studies testing for pUblic-private wage differentials. Bhorat (2000) 
2 Woolard (2002) estimates approximately 16% of formal sector workers are employed in the public 
sector. 
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• 
approaches the wage differential problem differently by focussing on the racial wage 
cleavage. Testing for the presence of selection bias yielded an insignificant lambda 
coefficient and the author proceeded with OLS regression3. Bhorat (2000) does not 
investigate a public-private sector wage differential, but the inclusion of the trade 
union variable in his analysis reveals that trade union membership significantly 
influences workers wages in South Africa. 
This paper aims to evaluate public-private sector wage differentials for South Africa 
using two different econometric techniques that control for human capital and other 
observable worker characteristics while simultaneously controlling for unobserved 
worker characteristics that could be correlated with wages and sector selection. An 
important aspect of the study of wage differentials is that sample selection bias and 
endogeneity is prevalent due to the non-random way in which individuals exercise 
their choice of sector and type of employment decisions. Switching regression models 
are typically utilised to overcome such biases (Adamchik and Bedi, 2000; Panizza 
and Qiang, 2005). The existing South African work (Woolard, 2002; Bhorat, 2000) 
that I reviewed above, has not used these switching models and a major part of the 
rationale of this paper is to ascertain whether better econometric practice actually 
makes a difference to their conclusions. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the data and 
important definitions. Section 3 presents a basic literature review of the origins of the 
switching regression model and recent panel studies. Section 4 discusses the 
econometric methodology. The main findings are presented in Section 5. The next 
section presents wage differentials based on the full information maximum likelihood 
3 Bhorat (2000) employed the Heckman two-step method to test for the presence of selection bias. The 
lambda coefficient was insignificant and the author concluded that no selection bias was present 
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methodology. Section 7 summanses and concludes with a discussion of policy 
implications of the results for South Africa. 
2. Data and Definitions 
The core data used in the analytical investigation of pay premia comes from a cross-
section of the Labour Force Surveys (LFS), representing the period September 2002. 
The LFS is a rotating panel survey conducted bi-annually, covering approximately 30 
000 households. 
The first stage of sampling for the LFS consists of 3 000 primary sampling units 
(PSU s) with at least 100 dwellings per PSU based on the enumerator areas of the 1996 
Population Census. Thereafter 10 units are systematically drawn from each PSu. 
Special dwellings such as hospital, prisons and hotels are specifically excluded from 
the sample. Each dwelling is visited on five different occasions at most. As a result, 
wave 4 (LFS 2001:2) to wave 8 (LFS 2003 :2) would constitute the 5 occasions on 
which the same dwellings were visited before a new sample was drawn. 
The LFS is specifically designed to elicit detailed information about respondents' 
labour market activities and asks distinct questions about the sector of employment 
and trade union affiliation (Statistics South Africa, 2002). A breakdown of these 
probing questions allows the level of government employment or affiliation to a 
government enterprise to be established. Specific questions are put to respondents 
about the type of employment they are in, and this enables workers to be classified 
according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 
classification. This enables the construction of an occupation variable that will be 
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used for identification in the sector-selection equation. This type of information would 
be useful in examining individuals' movements both within occupations and between 
public and private sector employment. 
The study sample consists of individual workers, aged between 15 and 65 years for 
which information is available for wages and all other relevant attributes. This age 
restriction is in accordance with South African labour regulations, where individuals 
are eligible for employment at 15 years whilst the mandatory retirement age has been 
capped at 65 years and 60 years for males and females respectively. For the purposes 
of this study, incomplete records were ignored. Only employed individuals with 
positive earnings were included in this study. 
Respondents were classified as public sector workers if they work in central, 
provincial or local government or are employed in parastatals such as Telkom or 
Transnet where government has some shareholding. Private sector workers are those 
employed for a private business or household, business leagues or professional 
associations. For the purposes of this study, the private sector self-employed are 
excluded. 
3. A Review of the Econometric Literature on Estimating Public and Private 
Wage Differentials 
a. Origins of the Switching Regression Model 
The seminal work on the endogenous switching regression models for public-private 
wage differentials is that of Gyourko & Tracy (1988). Many previous studies that 
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evaluated public-private and union-nonunion wage differentials treat union status as 
endogenous, but failed to recognise that workers also exercise some choice over 
sector of employment. Failure to recognise that sector choice is endogenous could 
lead to selection bias of the estimated wage equation coefficients (Gyourko and Tracy, 
1988, Panizza and Qiang, 2005 and Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003). Gyourko and 
Tracy (1988) applied their model across four different labour market states; namely, 
private/non-union, private/union, public/non-union and public/union in the United 
States of America. Focussing on the public-private sector wage differential, they 
found a small but significant public sector wage advantage of 3.8%. The authors 
highlight the importance of calculating both conditional and unconditional wage 
differentials for policy reasons, as unconditional wage differentials are exposed to 
larger sampling errors. According to Gyourko and Tracy (1988) the unconditional 
wage represents the average wage an individual who is chosen at random from the 
population with the same observable characteristics as the average public sector 
worker would receive. Unconditional characteristics do not take selection effects into 
consideration when calculating expected wages. The conditional differential 
represents a random worker from each sector with the same observable 
characteristics. Having observed the choice of sector, the differential represents both 
the returns to the observable characteristics and levels and returns of unobservable 
characteristics. Moreover, given that the OLS method yields biased coefficients due to 
distributional assumptions and forms the basis of their quantitative calculation, both 
conditional and unconditional wage differentials are more appropriate for observing 
the true wage differential. 
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h. Literature on Developing Countries (Cross-Sectional estimates) 
Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) investigate if a wage differential exists in the 
formal sector of the Cote d'Ivoire labour market, where the formal sector of an 
economy is divided into the public and private sectors. Highlighting the assumption 
that wages are set equal to marginal productivity under the Mincerian approach, they 
argue that there are many reasons that this may not hold true. Non-competitive market 
forces such as unions and employment legislation contribute to falsifying this 
assumption. In addition to this, the problem of increasing wage differentials between 
the sectors is more pronounced in countries where the public sector dominates wage 
employment. Having raised these concerns, Van der Gaag & Vijverberg (1998) 
contribute to existing literature by constructing and estimating a switching regression 
model that is robust to sector choice and that consists of two wage equations and one 
"switching" equation. The importance of the switching equation is to account for the 
endogeneity that arises when individuals are assigned either a dummy variable to 
indicate their sector status or when separate equations are estimated for each sector. 
By treating sector choice as an endogenous variable, they find that Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimates reveal a substantial premium to public sector workers. OLS 
results do not correct for the selection bias, which they show to be quite large. 
They emphasise that OLS estimates based on sector-specific samples yield 
significantly biased results, driven by the unobserved characteristics of workers. Their 
results show the relative importance of human capital defined as years of education 
and experience over qualifications (diplomas acquired). Women are preferred over 
men in the public sector and the completion of high school is an important 
determinant of obtaining ajob in the public sector. 
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Lokshin and Jovanovic (2003) evaluate wage differentials and sector employment in 
Yugoslavia for the period 1995 to 2000. They initially reject OLS in favour of a Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) specification, where the system of 
equations (the two wage equations and the switching equation) is estimated 
simultaneously. Aware that the joint normality of the error terms assumption is a 
restrictive one and could yield biased results if it does not hold, the authors relax this 
assumption and estimate the system of equations under a Semi-Parametric Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (SPFIML) method. The FIML method is rejected 
in favour of the SPFIML method. Parametric techniques entail the explicit modelling 
of the functional form of a given dependent variable and explanatory variables. Semi-
parametric techniques involve the relaxation of the distributional assumptions of the 
error terms vis-a-vis the explanatory variables while allowing for consistent 
estimation of the [J's. The parametric approach requires the specification of the 
distribution of the error terms whereas the semi-parametric approach is not dependant 
on this assumption. If the incorrect form of the distribution of the error terms IS 
assumed, it could result in inconsistent estimates of the [J's (Hsiao, 2003). 
Their estimations based on this FIML methodology suggest that there is a private 
sector wage advantage for men but an insignificant wage premium for women. Men 
who have completed high school or professional school have a significant private 
sector premium. No wage premium exists for women, except those with professional 
school or university education. The sector equation draws attention to the higher 
likelihood of single people being employed in the private sector. The number of 
jobholders in the household has a positive and significant effect on obtaining a job in 
the private sector for women but not for men. 
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Panizza and Qiang (2005) evaluate public-private sector wage differentials for 13 
Latin American countries allowing for different assumptions about the correlation 
structure between the sectoral and wage equations. One assumption the authors 
impose is that public (private) sector workers perform better in the public (private) 
sector than random individuals from the sample4. Illustrated by the alternative 
assumptions is that OLS estimations can be robust to selectivity bias. Irrespective of 
the econometric technique applied, a public sector wage premium is observed, with 
females enjoying a larger premium than men. The male premium ranges from 4% to 
28% while the female premium is anywhere between 19% and 37%. An important 
observation noted by Panizza and Qiang is that earnings inequality is lower amongst 
public sector workers. In addition, the premium to public sector workers is inversely 
related to a worker's position in the distribution of wages. Put simply, public sector 
workers at the bottom end of the public sector wage distribution benefit from a large 
premium over private sector workers at similar points on the private sector wage 
distribution. The opposite prevails for workers at the top end of the public and private 
sector wage distributions (Katz and Kruger, 1991 and Blank 1993 cited in Panizza and 
Qiang, 2005). As will be illustrated later, similar results are found for South Africa. 
Thus, it can be seen that in order to overcome the problems of endogenous sector 
selection a number of sophisticated econometric fixes have been proposed. The use of 
panel data can also assist to overcome two common problems of selection bias and 
measurement error in cross-sectional data, as is shown in the Disney and Gosling 
(2003) paper reviewed below. 
4 Positive selection in either sector 
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c. Longitudinal estimates for Pay Premia 
Disney and Gosling (2003) evaluate public sector pay premia for Britain in the 
1990' s. They argue that contrary to common belief, cross sectional estimates are not 
necessarily biased upwards due to selection bias and panel data estimates are not 
necessarily biased downwards due to endogeneity and measurement error in the data. 
To demonstrate this, they adopt a novel instrumental approach to the estimation of the 
pay premia. The first instrument is robust to measurement error and is conditioned on 
the probability of the individual being in the public sector in period i doing occupation 
o at time t, minus the probability of the individual working in the public sector at time 
t-l doing the same occupation. Disney and Gosling employed this method to 
overcome changes in sector status due to unobserved worker characteristics. Hence all 
changes in public sector status are exogenously determined by privatisations. The 
second instrument only looks at occupation at time t - 1, ignoring differences in 
occupation at time t. Their results show that a wage premium exists for men in the 
public sector, although it is statistically insignificant. Men with college education earn 
significantly less in the public sector than men with college education in the private 
sector. Women experience a wage premium in the public sector that is significantly 
different from their private sector counterparts. Similar results are found for women 
with college education as for men with college education. 
This approach was applied to the available South African panel data but results were 
inconclusive due to the lack of sufficient employees who transition between public 
and private sector employments. 
5 The study sample only has a 3% movement between sectors, either to the public sector or from the 
public to the private sector. 
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The release of more recent cross-sections of the LFS will enable future study on long-
term wage differentials in South Africa. Cross-sectional estimates are the starting 
point for short-term wage differential estimates while panel data could reveal more 
information about long-term trends6. 
4. Methodology 
The existence of the public and private sectors influences the formal-sector 
employment decisions within the labour market (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003). If the 
formal sector of the labour market is only portioned into the public and private 
sectors, an individual will compare the net benefits in each sector in choosing between 
the two. A two-step process is involved in sector selection. The first step is the 
decision of whether or not to attempt to obtain a public sector job. The second step 
entails being offered a public sector job (Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988). The 
probability of an individual being offered a public sector job depends on the 
characteristics of that worker observable to the employer. 
To evaluate possible differences in wages between the two sectors, a human capital 
model is set up taking a common Mincerian form (Mincer and Polachek, 1974): 
In W P X fJ P P I = I I + £1 (1) 
I NP = X. fJ NP + £ NP n WI I I I (2) 
6 See appendix 
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where the superscript P denotes the public sector, the superscript NP denotes the 
private sector, Xi is a matrix of wage determining explanatory variables, fJ is the 
corresponding coefficients to be estimated and c: is the error term. 
We can formalise a worker's choice of sector by equating the log wages of equations 
(1) and (2). A worker will try to obtain a public sector job if 
(3) 
where Z, is a vector of variables influencing a worker's choice to work in the public 
sector and U, is a composite error term. This equation summarises the two step 
process where the expected wage in the public sector needs to be large enough to 
encourage the worker to seek public sector employment and secondly the worker is 
chosen from the queue of workers (Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988). 
This paper proceeds by estimating equations (1) and (2) based on two alternative 
assumptions about the correlation of the error terms B,?, Btl' and U;. The first method 
is simple OLS regression to illustrate the presence of a wage premium in either sector. 
This accords with the existing South African work. The second method is the FIML 
method of switching regression. Generally, OLS estimation of equations (1) and (2) 
may lead to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients due to selection bias stemming 
from sample selection and worker self-selection into sectoral employment. Moreover, 
OLS produces biased results due to worker characteristics that may be unobservable 
to the econometrician but that affect both wages and sector selection. A common 
method utilised to overcome this selection problem is the endogenous switching 
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method (Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988, Heitmueller, 2004 and Lokshin and 
Jovanovic, 2003). 
If we substitute (1) and (2) into (3) and assume that all variables that determine wages 
also determine the probability of obtaining a public sector job then the following 
results: 
1=1 if L,6 + v, >0 (the individual has a public sector job) 
I = 0 otherwise 
(4) 
(5) 
where v, = B,? - B,N? - u, and the vector L includes all exogenous variables in vectors 
X and Z. Equations (4) and (5) illustrate that individual i will be employed in the 
public sector if the gains from employment are positive and in the private sector 
otherwise (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003). Given the above structure and the 
assumption of joint normality of the distribution of the error terms, consistent 
estimates can be achieved by maximum likelihood estimation. This method yields 
unbiased estimates of the coefficients of the variablesX"Zi and L
" 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
For the purposes of analysing the public-private sector wage gap, the sample is 
restricted to full-time employed individuals who reported positive earnings and hours 
worked for September 2002. 
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This sample is similar in composition to the Woolard (2002) and Bhorat (2000) 
studies undertaken to examine wage differentials in South Africa. The limited number 
of observations in this study is due to the manner in which respondents were 
questioned during the period, resulting in incomplete records that were not useful for 
the purposes of this study. Tables la and 1 b below summarise the characteristics of 
the respondents. 
Table 1 a: Selected summaI)' statistics of variables used in the analysis 
Males 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Age 40.37* 9.81 37.53* 11.01 
Education 10.16* 4.17 8.12* 4.43 
Experience 11.90* 8.58 7.33* 8.30 
Trade Union 0.742 0.319 
Marital Status 
Married 0.753 0.664 
Education 
No education 0.042 0.104 
Complete Primal)' 0.158 0.349 
Incomplete High 0.064 0.104 
Complete High 0.590 0.389 
Tertial)' 0.146 0.054 
Race 
African 0.711 0.666 
Cloured 0.125 0.173 
Indian 0.033 0.042 
White 0.131 0.119 
Note: * indicates that the difference is statisticaIly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Source: Author's own calculations using LFS 
16 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
The total sample SIze for the analysis is 12 409 observations. Of this, 3 296 
individuals are employed in the public sector while 9 113 individuals are employed in 
the private sector. Of all female workers, 34% are employed in the public sector and 
66% employed in the private sector. For males, 22% are employed in the public sector 
and 78% are employed in the private sector. Approximately half of all public sector 
workers are female while only 34% of all private sector workers are female. The 
experience variable is calculated as strictly the number of years worked, as the age 
minus schooling minus 6 could lead to inflated experience estimations. 
Table 1 b: Selected summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
Females 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Age 39.88* 8.91 35.08* 9.99 
Education 12.58* 3.24 9.96* 4.00 
Experience 10.95* 8.40 5.46* 6.45 
Trade Union 0.748 0.223 
Marital Status 
Married 0.552 0.495 
Education 
No education 0.021 0.058 
Complete Primary 0.070 0.229 
Incomplete High 0.034 0.099 
Complete High 0.668 0.559 
Tertiary 0.207 0.055 
Race 
African 0.721 0.525 
Coloured 0.105 0.221 
Indian 0.029 0.050 
White 0.145 0.204 
Note: * indicates that the difference is statistically different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Source: Author's own calculations using LFS 
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Analysis reveals that both male and female public sector workers are significantly 
older, more experienced and have an average of 2 more years of education than 
private sector workers. On the other hand private sector workers work approximately 
4 more hours per week than public sector workers. Compared to male private sector 
workers, 9% more public sector workers are married. The racial distribution of 
workers between sectors reveals that the private sector employs a larger percentage of 
White workers than the public sector. For African individuals, a larger proportion of 
workers are employed in the public sector. Trade union membership is prevalent in 
the public sector. 
Table 2a : Hourly log wage by race, education and gender 
Males 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
All Workers 2.981 * 0.834 2.044* 1.080 
Trade Union 3.079* 0.736 2.479* 0.712 
Education 
No education 2.191 * 0.792 1.272* 0.826 
Compete Primary 2.290* 0.632 1.567* 0.850 
Incomplete High 2.315* 0.731 1.867* 0.791 
Complete High 3.109* 0.716 2.506* 0.985 
Tertiary 3.701 * 0.644 3.597* 0.877 
Race 
African 3.166* 0.754 2.231 * 0.88 
Coloured 3.205* 0.704 2.264* 0.892 
Indian 3.057* 0.771 2.941 * 0.724 
White 3.591 * 0.593 3.419* 0.808 
Note: * indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log wage is 
statistically 
different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Source: Author's own calculations 
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Male workers in the public sector earn, on average, significantly higher wages than 
their counterparts in the private sector. Woolard (2002) suggests this can be attributed 
to high levels of human capital within the public sector and that individuals within the 
public sector are duly rewarded with higher wages due to individual attributes. Closer 
inspection of the educational attainment reveals public sector workers do have 
significantly higher levels of education, supporting Woolard's claim. The gender 
breakdown reveals that females earn more in the public sector than the private sector, 
while males also experience a wage premium in the public sector. 
Table 2b : Hourly log wage by race, education and gender 
Females 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
All Workers 3.099* 0.785 l.999* 1.096 
Trade Union 3.209* 0.662 2.254* 0.906 
Education 
No education 2.117* 0.653 0.828* 0.609 
Compete Primary 2.101 * 0.743 1.173* 0.765 
Incomplete High 2.334* 0.710 1.659* 0.790 
Complete High 3.412* 0.684 2.398* 0.959 
Tertiary 3.520* 0.667 3.228* 0.965 
Race 
African 3.030* 0.805 l.555* 0.972 
Coloured 3.080* 0.776 l.931 * 0.912 
Indian 3.269* 0.553 2.563* 0.710 
White 3.420* 0.635 3.075* 0.825 
Note: * indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log wage is 
statistically 
different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Source: Author's own calculations 
Examining mean wages by race reveals some interesting information. For females, 
African workers earn the lowest wages amongst all race groups in the public sector, 
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while for males Indian workers earn the lowest wages. For females, African and 
Coloured workers earn similar wages in the public sector while White workers have 
the highest wage. In the private sector, African workers earn the lowest wages for 
both genders. Male Coloured and African workers earn roughly the same wage in the 
private sector, with White workers earning significantly higher wages than any of the 
race groups in the private sector. 
Examining wages by educational breakdown reveals some critical information. 
Workers in the private sector are heavily penalised for no educational attainment, 
especially females. The public sector pays generally the same wages for female 
workers from no education to complete primary school education. Workers in the 
public sector with incomplete high school education earn approximately the same as 
workers with completed high school education in the private sector. Moving from 
incomplete high school education to tertiary education in the public sector delivers 
approximately the same reward as moving from compete high school education to 
tertiary education in the private sector for females. It appears that there are large 
rewards for those who attain tertiary education in the private sector, with the mean log 
hourly wage increasing from 2.398 to 3.228 for females and from 2.506 to 3.597 for 
males. 
Given South Africa's economic and political history, it is not surprising that White 
wages are significantly higher than all other races. Moreover, the government is 
committed to correcting the injustices of the past and this could be a possible 
explanation for the higher wages at the lower end of the educational distribution, 
where the majority of African and Coloured individuals would fall in terms of the 
educational distribution. 
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6. Estimation Results 
6.1 The Sector Choice equation 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the sector selection equation under FIML estimation 
for males and females respectively. A positive coefficient indicates that a variable 
contributes to the likelihood of obtaining public sector employment rather than private 
sector employment. All estimations include the application of clustering and weights. 
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Table 3: FIML estimation ofthe sector selection equation 
Males Females 
Variables 
Constant -3.8548 (l.0179)** -3.4616 (0.5836)* 
Age 0.0551 (0.0229)** 0.0672 (0.0276)** 
Age2 -0.0006 (0.0002) -0.0009 (0.0003)** 
Experience 0.0253 (0.0044)* 0.0327 (0.0055)* 
Experience2 0.0000 (0.0005)* 0.0000 (0.0000)* 
Married -0.0631 (0.0844) -0.1172 (0.0076) 
Trade Union 0.8509 (0.0752)* 0.7811 (0.0738)* 
Education 
Primary completed or less 0.1287 (0.1663) -0.1925 (0.1122)*** 
Incomplete High School 0.0423 (0.1671) -0.3593 (0.2678) 
Complete High School 0.3276 (0.1682)*** -0.1568 (0.2029) 
Tertiary Education 0.7267 (0.1451 )* 0.1060 (0.2477) 
Race 
Coloured -0.0824 (0.0781)* -0.2354 (0.1332)*** 
Indian -0.1046 (0.0989) -0.3159 (0.0960)* 
White -0.1704 (0.0998)*** -0.5430 (0.1237)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.4821 (0.1869)* 0.4678 (0.1871)** 
Technical and associate professionals 0.1021 (0.1520) 0.4741 (0.1597)* 
Clerks 0.1299 (0.1480) 0.1552 (0.1868)* 
Service workers & shop & market sales 
workers 0.2039 (0.0840)** -0.3865 (0.2021) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.0473 (0.1766) 0.0906 (0.3526)** 
Craft and related trade workers -0.017 (0.1183) 0.0035 (0.2765) 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.4053 (0.1210)* -0.1062 (0.2958) 
Elementary Occupation 0.1671 (0.1142) -0.1630 (0.1944) 
Industry 
Mining -0.7201 (0.2076)* 0.0349 (0.5296) 
Manufacturing -0.1024 (0.1884) -0.2124 (0.2716) 
Electricity and Gas 2.525 (0.2195)* 2.7957 (0.3545)* 
Construction 1.2046 (0.1923)* l.7505 (0.4084)* 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.0248 (0.1779) 0.0861 (0.3041 ) 
Transport & storage 1.7963 (0.1252)* 1.7716 (0.2787* 
Financial Intermediation 0.3598 (0.1731)** 0.5682 (0.2487)** 
Community and Social Work 2.7311 (0.1365)* 2.4382 (0.2313)* 
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Private Households 
Source: Author's own calculations using LFS 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at the 10% level 
-4.8025 (0.2134)* -5.5599 (0.3597)* 
The set of explanatory variables for this estimation include: educational dummies with 
no education serving as the omitted category, a dummy variable indicating marital 
status, racial dummies with African the omitted category, occupational dummies with 
legislators, senior officials and managers as the omitted category, industry dummies 
with agriculture as the omitted category, and age and experience variables. A trade 
union dummy variable was included in the estimation with a value of one representing 
trade union membership and a value of zero indicating no trade union affiliation. 
These variables are the standard explanatory variables for wage and sector 
determination. The variables chosen for this study compare favourably with similar 
studies. 
For both males and females, experience has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of being employed in the public sector. Females are less likely than males 
to gain employment in the public sector. Although insignificant, males with 
incomplete primary school education and incomplete high school education are no 
less likely than those males with no formal education to gain employment in the 
public sector. Complete high school education and tertiary education significantly 
affects the likelihood of public sector employment for males. On the other hand for 
females all educational attainment above primary school does not significantly affect 
the likelihood of obtaining public sector employment. For females, all races are 
significantly less likely than African female workers to gain public sector 
employment. Trade union membership significantly determines the probability of 
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gaining public sector employment. A male worker with trade union affiliation is 85% 
more likely than a male worker with no trade union affiliation to obtain employment, 
compared to a female trade union member who is 78% more likely than a female non-
trade union worker to obtain employment in the public sector. For males, White and 
Coloured individuals are less likely than Africans to be employed in the public sector, 
while Indian individuals' employment probabilities in the public sector are 
insignificantly different from Africans. For males, only three occupations are flagged 
as significantly different to the reference category of legislators, senior officials and 
managers. The industry variables reveal some interesting information too. Males in 
the mining sector are less likely to be employed in the public sector. This is in contrast 
to females in the mining industry who are insignificantly different from the omitted 
category of agriculture. Males in the electricity and gas sector, construction, transport 
and storage and community and social work sectors are significantly more likely to 
gain public sector employment. A similar finding emerges for females. This finding 
appears to support the composition of these industries where the public sector drives 
these types of projects. 
6.2 Wage Equations 
Tables 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b present the OLS and FIML estimation estimates of the 
sector-specific wage equations. OLS differs from FIML in that OLS does not take 
account of the fact that some unobserved characteristics that influence the probability 
of sector selection also affect the wages a worker receives once in a given sector. 
Neglecting these selection effects leads to biased results of the relative earnings in 
both sector (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). By estimating these equations simultaneously, 
the FIML method corrects for these selection biases in the wage equations. 
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The set of explanatory variables include age and its square, experience and its square, 
education dummies with no education being the omitted category, racial dummies 
with African being the omitted category and occupational dummy variables with 
legislators, senior officials and managers as the omitted category. The main focus of 
this section is the FIML results as it accounts for the endogeneity inherent in the 
study .. 
25 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table 4a: OLS estimation of the wage equation for the private and public sectors 
Males 
Public Private 
Variables 
Constant 1.8999 (0.4228)* 0.4413 (0.2108)*** 
Age 0.0231 (0.0203) 0.0656 (0.0079)* 
Age2 -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0007 (0.0000)* 
Experience 0.0118 (0.0040)* 0.0085 (0.0030)** 
Experience2 0.0000 (0.0000)* 0.0000 (0.0000)** 
Trade Union 0.3172 (0.0553)* 0.5843 (0.1039)* 
Education 
Primary completed or less 0.0559 (0.1262) 0.2363 (0.0524)* 
Incomplete High School 0.1027 (0.1374) 0.4705 (0.0513)* 
Complete High School 0.5564 (0.1126)* 0.8467 (0.0615)* 
Tertiary Education 0.8324 (0.1413)* 1.2659 (0.0977)* 
Race 
Coloured 0.2032 (0.0486)* 0.2371 (0.0938)** 
Indian 0.2817 (0.0586)* 0.4495 (0.0695)* 
White 0.4469 (0.0549)* 0.7198 (0.0481)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.0067 (0.1082) 0.1151 (0.1082) 
Technical and associate 
professionals -0.1789 (0.0954)*** -0.2036 (0.0903)** 
Clerks -0.4675 (0.1155)* -0.5677 (0.0902)* 
Service workers & shop & market 
sales workers -0.5651 (0.1012)* -1.0078 (0.0848)* 
Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers -0.8231 (0.1459)* -1.1736 (0.1157)* 
Craft and related trade workers -0.6043 (0.1294)* -0.5639 (0.0926)* 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers -0.6003 (0.1486)* -0.7826 (0.1032)* 
Elementary Occupation -0.8518 (0.1154)* -1.1169 (0.0988)* 
Observations 1675 6006 
R-squared 0.4821 0.5712 
Source: Author's own calculations using LFS 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* * * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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For males in the private sector, individual characteristics affect earnings significantly. 
Age and experience contribute significantly to the determination of wages for men in 
the private sector. This is in contrast to male public sector workers whose wages are 
significantly influenced by experience only. For both sectors, trade union affiliation 
represents large gains in wages. A trade union worker in the public sector earns 
approximately 32% more than a non trade-union member in public service. In the 
private sector the wage advantage appears much larger. Male workers in the private 
sector who subscribe to a trade union earn approximately 58% more than workers 
who have no trade union affiliation. Returns to education at all levels are significantly 
different from zero for males in the private sector. In the public sector, completed 
primary schooling and incomplete high school education is insignificantly different 
from no formal schooling. Males in the private sector with completed high school 
earn on average 55% more than public sector workers with no education. 
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Table 4b: OLS estimation of the wage equation for the private and public sectors 
Females 
Public Private 
Variables 
Constant l.9103 (0.5640)* 0.5201 (0.2108)*** 
Age 0.0388 (0.0227) 0.0536 (0.0079)* 
Age2 -0.0004 (0.0002) -0.0005 (0.0000)* 
Experience 0.0090 (0.0025)* 0.0119 (0.0030)** 
Experience2 0.0000 (0.0000)* 0.0000 (0.0000)** 
Trade Union 0.2892 (0.0359)* 0.2528 (0.0565)* 
Education 
Primary completed or less 0.0007 (0.0917) 0.2246 (0.0945)** 
Incomplete High School -0.0218 (0.1352) 0.4456 (0.1042)* 
Complete High School 0.4066 (0.1418)** 0.8437 (0.1024)* 
Tertiary Education 0.7131 (0.2009)* 1.0529 (0.1323)* 
Race 
Coloured 0.0976 (0.0298)* 0.3439 (0.1125)* 
Indian 0.1776 (0.0550)* 0.5122 (0.1103)* 
White 0.2273 (0.0739)* 0.6685 (0.0698)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.2364 (0.1139)*** 0.2994 (0.1437)*** 
Technical and associate 
professionals -0.2598 (0.1529) -0.1431 (0.0504)** 
Clerks -0.4405 (0.1741)** -0.4510 (0.0602)* 
Service workers & shop & market 
sales workers -0.8854 (0.2194)* -0.8001 (0.0932)* 
Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers -0.9046 (0.2994)* -l.2750 (0.1505)* 
Craft and related trade workers -0.8856 (0.2828)* -0.7697 (0.0952)* 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers -0.7333 (0.2052)* -0.8168 (0.1718)* 
Elementary Occupation -0.9111 (0.2325)* -1.0679 (0.1067)* 
Observations 1621 3107 
R-squared 0.3868 0.5571 
Source: Author's own calculations using LFS 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Evaluation of the OLS estimates for females in the public and private sectors reveal a similar 
picture to the OLS estimates for males in these sectors respectively. Returns to education are 
markedly higher in the private sector for females than they are for females in the public sector. 
All occupation coefficients are significantly different from the reference category. Relative to 
males, female returns to trade union membership are much smaller. Females in the public sector 
with trade union membership earn 28% more than females who do not belong to a trade union. 
Males in the same position earn 31 % more. Trade union affiliation yields a larger return to 
females in the public sector than females in the private sector. 
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Table 5a: FIML estimation of the wage equation for the private and public sectors 
Males 
Public Private 
Variables 
Constant 2.1549 (0.4875)* 0.4427 (0.2108)** 
Age 0.0185 (0.0210) 0.0655 (0.0079)* 
Age2 -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0007 (0.0000)* 
Experience 0.0104 (0.0040)* 0.0085 (0.0030)* 
Experience2 0.0000 (0.0000)* 0.0000 (0.0000)* 
Trade Union 0.2490 (0.0580)* 0.5818 (0.1036)* 
Education 
Primary completed or less 0.0589 (0.1252) 0.2351 (0.0509)* 
Incomplete High School 0.0932 (0.1405) 0.4689 (0.0507)* 
Complete High School 0.5295 (0.1137)* 0.8434 (0.0609)* 
Tertiary Education 0.7845 (0.1433)* l.2614 (0.0969)* 
Race 
Coloured 0.1971 (0.0405)* 0.2377 (0.00937)** 
Indian 0.3210 (0.0729)* 0.4515 (0.0699)* 
White 0.4613 (0.0570)* 0.7227 (0.0476)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.0061 (0.1082) 0.1083 (0.1076) 
Technical and associate professionals -0.1998 (0.0957)** -0.2071 (0.0951)** 
Clerks -0.4910 (0.1155)* -0.5686 (0.0902)* 
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -0.5822 (0.1018)* -1.0078 (0.0848)* 
Ski lIed agricultural and fishery workers -0.8600 (0.1431)* -1.1734 (0.1158)* 
Craft and related trade workers -0.5839 (0.1240)* -0.5619 (0.0962)* 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.5454 (0.1372)* -0.7791 (0.1026)* 
Elementary Occupation -0.8548 (0.1152)* -1.1151 (0.0986)* 
Source: Author's own calculations using LFS 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* StatisticalIy significant at the 1 % level 
** StatisticalIy significant at the 5% level 
* * * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
FIML yields similar results to the OLS estimations7. A very interesting finding is that 
of trade union membership. The return to trade union membership is smaller in the 
7 A Wald test rejects equality of regression coefficients between the public and private sectors 
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public service at 25% (compared to 31 % calculated using OLS). The private sector 
trade union membership gain is stable at 58%. This leads to larger wage gains for 
male trade union members who are employed in the private sector. For both males and 
females in the public sector, age does not significantly affect wages. Experience 
appears to be the more influential factor, as evidenced in both the OLS and FIML 
estimations. In the public sector, only completed high school and tertiary 
qualifications significantly differ in their effects on wages from no educational 
attainment. All occupations except for Professionals earn significantly less than 
legislators, senior officials and managers in both the public and private sectors. 
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Table 5b: FIML estimation of the wage equation for the private and public sectors (females) 
Females 
Public Private 
Variables 
Constant 1.9494 (0.4875)* 0.5225 (0.2893)*** 
Age 0.0380 (0.0210) 0.0534 (0.0119)* 
Age2 -0.0004 (0.0002) -0.0006 (0.0001)* 
Experience 0.0087 (0.0040)* 0.0116 (0.0034)* 
Experience2 0.0000 (0.0000)* 0.0000 (0.0000)* 
Trade Union 0.2738 (0.0328)* 0.2373 (0.0503)* 
Education 
Primary completed or less 0.0095 (0.1252) 0.2209 (0.0948)** 
Incomplete High School -0.0095 (0.1405) 0.4416 (0.1044)* 
Complete High School 0.4138 (0.1137)* 0.8352 (0.1039)* 
Tertiary Education 0.7153 (0.1433)* 1.0412 (0.1340)* 
Race 
Coloured 0.0998 (0.0405)* 0.3504 (0.1149)* 
Indian 0.1846 (0.0729)* 0.5222 (0.1108)* 
White 0.2360 (0.0570)* 0.6824 (0.0736)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.2401 (0.1082) 0.2461 (0.1502) 
Technical and associate professionals -0.2660 (0.0957)** -0.1749 (0.0487)* 
Clerks -0.4389 (0.1155)* -0.4560 (0.0590)* 
Service workers & shop & market sales 
workers -0.8783 (0.1018)* -0.7983 (0.0936)* 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.9096 (0.1431 )* -1.2686 (0.1496)* 
Craft and related trade workers -0.8648 (0.1240)* -0.7590 (0.0957)* 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers -0.7154 (0.1372)* -0.8035 (0.1705)* 
Elementary Occupation -0.9048 (0.1152)* -1.0625 (0.1068)* 
Source: Authors own calculations using LFS 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* * * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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For females in the private sector, individual characteristics affect earnmgs 
significantly. All but one of the coefficients is significant, the professional occupation 
category. As expected, the coefficients on education and experience are positive and 
sizeable, but still smaller than those of males in the private sector. Returns to 
education at all levels are significantly different from zero for the private sector. In 
particular, returns to education for females are markedly higher in the private sector. 
All racial earnings are significantly different from zero. The largest earnings 
advantage is captured by White workers. On the other hand, in the public sector, 
earnings of individuals with completed primary or incomplete high school do not vary 
significantly from those with no educational attainment. 
For the public sector, only those with completed high school or above enJoy an 
earnings advantage. Indian individuals' wages are significantly different from African 
individuals' wages, with female Indian workers earning 18% more than female 
African workers in the public sector. This figure is 52% for the private sector. 
While an understanding of the factors allocating workers into private versus public 
formal employment is important in its own right, in any analysis of the wage 
differentials, it functions as a control for the endogeneity that results from the fact 
there is indeed sector selection that precedes actual earnings. Indeed we do observe 
substantial differences in coefficients between the two methodologies. For this reason, 
we proceed by calculating wage differentials based on the FIML estimations only. 
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7. Wage Differentials 
Given the selection equation and sector-specific wage equations presented in section 
5, we can compute wage differentials from our study sample. There are two distinct 
methods for calculating wage differentials from selection models (Gyourko and 
Tracy, 1988). When calculating unconditional wage differentials from expected wages 
in each labour market sector, the selection effect is set to zero. In contrast, the 
conditional wage differential includes the selection effects in the expected wages in 
each labour market sector. 
Table 6: Predicted log wages conditional on being employed in the particular sector 
Males 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
All Workers 3.081* 0.570 2.059* 0.846 
Trade Union 3.192* 0.504 2.564* 0.672 
Education 
No education 2.164* 0.233 1.194* 0.412 
Compete Primary 2.237* 0.309 1.497* 0.495 
Incomplete High 2.386* 0.344 1.833* 0.438 
Complete High 3.157* 0.358 2.482* 0.669 
Tertiary 3.720* 0.326 3.588* 0.614 
Race 
African 2.971 * 0.541 1.766* 0.638 
Coloured 3.026* 0.542 1.873* 0.675 
Indian 3.341* 0.454 2.748* 0.582 
White 3.639* 0.398 3.314* 0.58 
Note: * indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log 
wage is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
For all male public sector workers, the average predicted log hourly wage is 3.081 (R 
21.78) compared to private sector workers who earn 2.059 (R7.84). This represents a 
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basic wage differential in favour of public sector workers of 177%. Male members of 
trade unions earn substantially larger wages in the public sector than in the private 
sector. The average male employee in the public sector who subscribes to a trade 
union earns an hourly log wage of 3.192 (R24.34) compared to male private sector 
employees who subscribe to trade unions who earn 2.56 (R12.99). This represents a 
wage differential between the public and private sector for male trade union members 
of approximately 87%. 
Differences in earnings can vary depending on the characteristics of workers such as 
sector of employment, age, race, gender, level of experience, trade union affiliation 
and educational attainment. Tables 6 and 7 presents wage differentials between the 
public and private sectors by trade union affiliation, educational attainment and race. 
Table 7: Predicted log wages conditional on being employed in the particular sector 
Females 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
All Workers 2.989* 0.526 1.819* 0.779 
Trade Union 3.096* 0.471 2.057* 0.667 
Education 
No education 2.169* 0.185 1.194* 0.307 
Compete Primary 2.212* 0.260 1.241 * 0.358 
Incomplete High 2.287* 0.305 1.555* 0.408 
Complete High 3.070* 0.347 2.278* 0.592 
Tertiary 3.554* 0.262 3.174* 0.588 
Race 
African 2.927* 0.524 1.488* 0.547 
Coloured 2.898* 0.513 1.768* 0.595 
Indian 3.175* 0.433 2.596* 0.486 
White 3.350* 0.389 3.028* 0.481 
Note: * indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log 
wage is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
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Within the public sector, males earn approximately 9.6% more than females. A racial 
breakdown reveals a significant wage advantage for White workers over other racial 
groups in the public sector, ranging from 19% to 57% and 34% to 95% for females 
and males respectively. Males earn 27% more than females in the private sector. The 
racial breakdown in the private sector reveals a similar pattern to the public sector, but 
the wage differential is substantially larger for White workers, varying between 76% 
and 370% for males and 54% to 366% for females. 
Comparing wage differentials of the public and private sectors by educational 
attainment, we observe higher differentials at lower educational levels. Accordingly 
female public sector employees with no education earn on average 330% more than 
their private sector counterparts. The wage differential narrows substantially for both 
genders as educational attainment is increased. The wage advantage for male public 
sector workers with completed secondary school is 96%. For male workers with a 
tertiary qualification, the wage premium is narrowed substantially. Significantly, 
female workers in the public sector with a tertiary qualification enjoy significant wage 
advantages over females with the same educational attainment in the private sector. 
If wage differentials favour public sector workers almost repeatedly, then it becomes 
interesting to evaluate whether those workers currently employed in the private sector 
would have a similar wage advantage if they chose private sector employment instead. 
Table 8 presents simulated results of a public (private) sector worker's log hourly 
wage if they were employed in the private (public) sector. 
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Table 8a: Predicted log wages conditional on being employed in the alternative sector 
Males 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean StDev 
All Workers 2.906* 0.830 2.605* 0.576 
Trade Union 2.849* 0.483 3.094* 0.721 
Education 
No education 1.481* 0.394 2.083* 0.263 
Compete Primary 1.760* 0.458 2.183* 0.299 
Incomplete High 2.138* 0.498 2.290* 0.325 
Complete High 2.976 0.546 2.944 0.419 
Tertiary 3.876* 0.513 3.650* 0.409 
Race 
African 2.751* 0.784 2.389* 0.421 
Coloured 2.790* 0.752 2.506* 0.457 
Indian 3.258* 0.679 3.133* 0.375 
White 3.726* 0.626 3.476* 0375 
Note: * indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log 
wage is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
For male public sector workers, the expected log hourly wage in the private sector is 
3.094 (R13.53), while for private sector workers, the expected log hourly wage in the 
public sector is 2.849 (R17.27). This is a wage premium for the average private sector 
worker of 27%, unconditional on the sector of employment. Male public sector 
workers who switch to private sector employment maintain their earnings advantage. 
The average private sector worker with no education can expect to earn less if 
employed in the public sector instead. 
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Table 8b: Predicted log wages conditional on being employed in the alternative sector 
Females 
Public Private 
Mean StDev Mean St Dev 
All Workers 2.481 0.762 2.448 0.514 
Trade Union 2.592* 0.693 2.685* 0.434 
Education 
No education 1.065* 0.282 2.049* 0.211 
Compete Primary 1.333* 0.359 2.084* 0.757 
Incomplete High 1.706* 0.436 2.117* 0.297 
Complete High 2.586* 0.469 2.738* 0.404 
Tertiary 3.326 0.480 3.388 0.352 
Race 
African 2.301 * 0.711 2.281* 0.395 
Coloured 2.332* 0.434 2.482* 0.701 
Indian 2.925* 0.572 2.892* 0.422 
White 3.282* 0.518 3.151* 0.400 
Note: * indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log 
wage is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
For female public sector workers, the expected log hourly wage in the private sector is 
2.481 (R 11. 95), while for private sector workers, the expected log hourly wage in the 
public sector is 2.448 (Rl1.56). This represents a statistically insignificant wage 
advantage of 3%. At lower levels of education, if female public sector workers were 
employed in the private sector, they would still earn a wage premium. Females with 
tertiary qualification can choose to work in either sector as the wages are 
insignificantly different between the sectors. The race variables indicate that female 
private sector employees who switch to the public sector would have the wage 
advantage. 
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8. Summary and Policy Options 
In this paper I have analysed the differences in wages across the formal sector labour 
market in South Africa and investigated the factors that influence a worker's 
probability of employment in either sector. This latter step is a contribution to the 
South African literature as, up to this point, the empirical work has not given 
recognition to the fact that public and private sector employment may be a choice. 
The main findings follow. 
Females who are members of trade umons are less likely than male trade umon 
members to gam employment in the public sector. For both males and females, 
individuals with higher levels of work experience are more likely to be working in the 
public sector. Female individuals with completed primary schooling or less are less 
likely to work in the public sector than workers with no educational attainment. 
Notably, Coloured and White workers are less likely than African workers to work in 
the public sector. Individuals associated with electricity, construction and community, 
and social work are more likely than individuals associated with the agricultural 
industry to be employed in the public sector. 
Examination of the wage structure of the South African labour market reveals that the 
differences in wages between the public and private sectors are positive and high. 
During September 2002, the average wage in the public sector was 174% larger than 
the average wage in the private sector. Once in the public sector, the average male 
earns 177% more than his private sector counterpart. Similarly for females, the 
average public sector worker earns 222% more than her private sector counterpart. 
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The wage structure differs across the two sectors. Wage distributions illustrate that 
public sector pay is higher at most educational levels and experience, but tapers at the 
highest educational levels. Pedersen et al (1990) allude to a smaller variance in the 
distribution of public sector wages, a characteristic of public sector pay around the 
world. They argue that this reflects more rigid pay scales than in the private sector. 
The narrower wage distribution in the public sector is attributed to the higher mean 
wages of the lower-income earners in the public sector when compared to the private 
sector. Scrutiny of pay scales in the South African public sector coupled with the 
results of this analysis support Pedersen et aI's claim of pay rigidity in the public 
sector. The findings also show there is a differing underlying process in wage 
determination between the public and private sectors. The determination of pay scales 
in the public and private sectors appear to be different at a surface level, but it would 
be informative to thoroughly investigate pay scales to determine its effect on wages 
and employment. Moreover, it would be useful to explore the differences arising out 
of this study with LFS panel data. 
The question arises of the consequences of the wage differential in the formal sector 
of the labour market. It does not appear that public sector employees are more 
efficient than their private sector counterparts, given that if private sector employees 
were employed in the public sector instead, the wage differential partly swings in their 
favour. It could be argued for that reason public sector employees are 'lucky' in their 
selection into employment in the public sector. 
Another issue that is related to the results of the paper is whether an increase in public 
sector wages could reduce corruption and thereby lead to a more efficient public 
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servIce. This is an important issue in public management and retention of staff. 
Contrary to common belief public sector workers earn higher wages than an identical 
private sector worker, so raising the public sector wage would not be an optimal 
policy solution. Increasing public sector wages would add significantly to public 
expenditure while not guaranteeing a decrease in corruption or an increase in 
government efficiency (Panniza and Qiang, 2005). 
An alternative suggestion for the large wage premiums that exist on a racial basis 
could be explained by means of government policy to promote the employment of 
previously disadvantaged individuals in the workplace. This argument is weak given 
the results, which show that White workers have a larger public sector wage 
differential than Black workers. The wage differential for Black males is 233% in 
favour of public sector employees while for White workers it is 38%. Closer 
examination of the White/Black wage differential within the public sector exposes an 
earnings advantage for White workers over Black workers8. Arguably, the 
Black/White wage gap is smaller in the public sector than in the private sector. It 
could therefore be weakly argued that the state is indeed acting as 'leading by 
example'. This type of non-market character of wage differentials is reasoned by 
Lindauer and Sabot (1983) as distorting the allocation of human resources and as a 
result negatively impacting on economic growth. With ASGISA and the attainment of 
6% economic growth as the main government economic policy over the next few 
years, an investigation into the non-market nature of wage differentials in South 
Africa is required if the country is to capitalise on such extensive wage differentials. 
8 White workers in the public sector have an earnings advantage over all other races. 
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APPENDIX 
The panel data set used to illustrate the potential of panel estimates for observing 
long-term wage differentials comes from the South African Labour Force Survey, 
covering the period September 2002 to September 2003. 
In September 2001 a completely new sample was drawn from Statistics South 
Africa's Master Sample. This sample of 30 000 households was the basis for 4 
subsequent waves. However, the meta-data that Statistics South Africa releases with 
each cross-section, details that there was a 20% out-rotation of households for each 
interview wave, and a 20% in-rotation of households to maintain the sample size 
(Statistics South Africa, 2002). Due to the lack of repeat observations across all waves 
for these 20% of households, they were effectively excluded from the analysis. In 
September 2004 a new sample was drawn based on the Population Census of 2001, 
limiting the nature of the derived panel to 3 years (Statistics South Africa, 2005). 
Statistics South Africa (SSA) states that in each cross-section of the LFS households 
retained the same unique household identifier, enabling the linking of cross-sections 
to form a large panel data set (Statistics South Africa, 2003). Based on this 
information, a unique identifier at the individual level was created by concatenating 
the household number with the person identifier number. Cross-sections are pooled to 
form the panel data set based on the recurrence of individuals across all periods, 
conditioning on age, race and gender. This method is shown to be flawed by 
Ranchhod and Dinkelman (2006) as SSA has confirmed that the person orders within 
households are not maintained across cross-sections. 
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" 
These estimates should be considered unconditional estimates due to the application 
of the switching regression model to panel data. As no variable was included in the 
study to account for time-varying individual characteristics, the results below are an 
indicator of the potential impact panel studies could have on policy formation in 
future. 
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Table A: FIML of sector selection applied to panel data set of LFS 
Variables Public 
Constant -2.5044 (1.0179)* 
Age 0.0179 (0.0488) 
Age' -0.0004 (0.0006) 
Experience 0.0843 (0.0179)* 
Experience' -0.0014 (0.0005)* 
Female -0.3032 (0.1208)* 
Marital Status -0.0558 (0.1200) 
Education 
Primary completed or less -0.4867 (02492)** 
Incomplete High School -0.4466 (0.2415)** 
Complete High School -0.3096 (0.2566) 
Tertiary Education 0.0066 (0.3058) 
Race 
Coloured -0.3994 (0.1248)* 
Indian 0.0105 (0.1989) 
White -0.4776 (0.1696)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.0486 (02617) 
Technical and associate professionals 0.1522 (0.2416) 
Clerks 0.2929 (0.2559) 
Service workers & shop & market sales workers 0.0456 (0.2585) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.4097 (0.5081) 
Craft and related trade workers 0.3077 (0.2646) 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.0593 (02671) 
Elementary Occupaion 0.1595 (0.2613) 
Industry 
Mining -0.7693 (0.4255)** 
Manufacturing 0.3300 (0.3146) 
Electricity and Gas 2.6073 (03407)' 
Construction 17817 (0.3486)* 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.3 752 (0.3120) 
Transport & storage 2.6377 (0.3146)* 
Financial Intermediation 1.1809 (0.3508)* 
Community and Social Work 3.4059 (0.3205)* 
Private Households -3.6734 (0.5899)* 
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Table B: OLS estimation of the wage equation for the private and public sectors 
Public Private 
Variables 
Constant 1.5141 (0.4476)' 0.1981 (0.2779) 
Age 0.0734 (0.02021)' 0.0842 (0.0124)' 
Age2 -0.0008 (0.0002)' -0.0008 (0.0002)' 
Experience 0.0073 (0.0075) 0.0268 (0.0051)' 
Experience2 -0.0001 (00002) -0.0004 (0.0002)" 
Female -0.1618 (0.0347)' -0.2233 (0.0362)" 
Education 
Primary completed or less -0.1603 (0.1363) 0.3999 (0.0761)' 
Incomplete High School 0.1777 (0.1201) 0.7184 (0.0767)' 
Complete High School 0.4682 (0.1223)' 1.0574 (0.0812)' 
Tertiary Education 0.7089 (0.1351)' 1.5001 (01148)' 
Race 
Coloured 0.1900 (00472)' 0.1459 (0.0382)' 
Indian 0.0456 (0.1148) 0.3921 (00655)' 
White 0.3275 (0.0470)' 0.5624 (0.0597)' 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.1676 (01088) -0.3111 (0.1201)" 
Technical and associate professionals -0.1632 (01032) -0.3098 (0.0915)' 
Clerks -0.5039 (0.1060)' -0.5964 (0.0838)' 
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -0.5355 (0.1117)' -0.9319 (0.0908)' 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.9238 (0.2141)' -0.8919 (02573)' 
Craft and related trade workers -0.6777 (0.1359)' -0.5456 (0.0808)' 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.7259 (0.1249)' -0.7704 (0.0841 )' 
Elementary Occupaion -0.8179 (0 1187)' -1.0774 (0.0846)' 
NxT 1206 1734 
R-square 0.4081 0.5084 
Source: Authors own calculations 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
, Statistically significlilt at the 5% level 
" Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table C: FIML estimation of the wage equation for the private and public sectors'. 
Public Private 
Variables 
Constant 1.8592 (0.5341)* 0.2080 (0.3798) 
Age 0.0665 (0.0246)* 0.0837 (0.0167)" 
Age2 -00007 (0.0003)* -00009 (0.0002)* 
Experience -00039 (0.0110) 0.0266 (00070)* 
Experience2 0.0001 (00003) -0.0004 (0.0002)** 
Female -0.1407 (00428)* -0.2244 (00504)* 
Education 
Primary completed or less -0.1011 (01417) 0.3968 (0.1103)* 
Incomplete High School 0.2021 (0 1372) 0.7157 (0.1098)* 
Complete High School 0.4618 (0 1406)* 1.0534 (0.1154)* 
Tertiary Education 0.6659 (0.1583)* 1.4931 (0.1549)* 
Race 
Coloured 0.2203 (0.0590)* 0.1486 (0.0551 )" 
Indian 0.1147 (0.1186) 0.3947 (0.0919)* 
White 0.3972 (0.0758)* 0.5653 (0.0799)* 
Occupation 
Professionals -0.2118 (0.1102)** -0.3212 (0.1398)** 
Technical and associate professionals -0.2285 (0.1063)* -0.3193 (0 1246)* 
Clerks -0.5505 (0.1088)* -0.5980 (0.1080)* 
Service workers & shop & market sales 
workers -0.5910 (0.1199)* -0.9325 (0.1181)* 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.9867 (02061)* -0.8901 (0.3471)* 
Craft and related trade workers -0.6243 (0 1385)* -0.5445 (0.1062)* 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers -0.7251 (0.1353)* -0.7744 (0 1106)* 
Elementary Occupaion -0.8808 (0.1293)* -10765 (0.1100)* 
Source: Authors own calculations 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
" Statistically significalt at the 5% level 
* * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
9 A Wald test rejects equality of regression coefficients between the public and private sectors 
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Table D: Predicted log wages conditional on being employed in the alternative sector 
Public 
Mean StDev 
All Workers 3.096* 0.524 
Gender 
Females 3.081' 0.530 
Males 3.105* 0.520 
Education 
No education 2.580* 0.168 
Compete Primary 2.549* 0.258 
Incomplete High 2.945* 0.302 
Complete High 3368* 0.393 
Tertiary 3.992' 0.394 
Race 
African 2.909' 0.409 
Coloured 3.025* 0.471 
Indian 3.284' 0.389 
White 3.809' 0.396 
Nole: ' indicates that the difference between the public and private sector log 
wage is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence leveL 
Mean 
2.855* 
2.862* 
2.850* 
1.381* 
1.909* 
2.420* 
2.937* 
3.555* 
2.761' 
2.740* 
3.001' 
3.482* 
Private 
StDev 
0.631 
0.547 
0.694 
0.231 
0.323 
0.429 
0386 
0.362 
0.597 
0.543 
0.579 
0.553 
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